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Abstract: We give suggestions for the presentation of research results from frequentist, information-theoretic, and 
Bayesian analysis paradigms, followed by several general suggestions. The information-theoretic and Bayesian 
methods offer alternative approaches to data analysis and inference compared to traditionally used methods. 
Guidance is lacking on the presentation of results under these alternative procedures and on nontesting aspects 
of classical frequentist methods of statistical analysis. Null hypothesis testing has come under intense criticism. We 
recommend less reporting of the results of statistical tests of null hypotheses in cases where the null is surely false 
anyway, or where the null hypothesis is of little interest to science or management. 
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For many years, researchers have relied heavily 
on testing null hypotheses in the analysis of fish- 
eries and wildlife research data. For example, an 
average of 42 P-values testing the statistical signif- 
icance of null hypotheses was reported for arti- 
cles in The Journal of Wildlife Management during 
1994-1998 (Anderson et al. 2000). This analysis 
paradigm has been challenged (Cherry 1998, 
Johnson 1999), and alternative approaches have 
been offered (Burnham and Anderson 2001). 
The simplest alternative is to employ a variety of 
classical frequentist methods (e.g., analysis of 
variance or covariance, or regression) that focus 
on the estimation of effect size and measures of 
its precision, rather than on statistical tests, P-val- 
ues and arbitrary, dichotomous statements about 
statistical significance or lack thereof. Estimated 
effect sizes (e.g., the difference between the esti- 
mated treatment and control means) are the 
results useful in future meta-analysis (Hedges 
and Olkin 1985), while P-values are almost useless 
in these important syntheses. A second alterna- 
tive is relatively new and based on criteria that 
estimate Kullback-Leibler information loss (Kull- 
back and Leibler 1951). These information-theo- 
retic approaches allow a ranking of various re- 
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search hypotheses (represented by models) and 
several quantities can be computed to estimate a 
formal strength of evidence for alternative 
hypotheses. Finally, methods based on Bayes' 
theorem have become useful in applied sciences 
due mostly to advances in computer technology 
(Gelman et al. 1995). 
Over the years, standard methods for present- 
ing results from statistical hypothesis tests have 
evolved. The Wildlife Society (1995a,b), for 
example, addressed Type II errors, statistical 
power, and related issues. However, articles by 
Cherry (1998),Johnson (1999), and Anderson et 
al. (2000) provide reason to reflect on how re- 
search results are best presented. Anderson et al. 
(2000) estimated that 47% of the P-values report- 
ed recently in The Journal of Wildlife Management 
were naked (i.e., only the P-value is presented 
with a statement about its significance or lack of 
significance, without estimated effect size or even 
the sign of the difference being provided). 
Reporting of such results provides no informa- 
tion and is thus without meaning. Perhaps more 
importantly, there are thousands of null hypothe- 
ses tested and reported each year in biological 
journals that are clearly false on simple a priori 
grounds (Johnson 1999). These are called "silly 
nulls" and account for over 90% of the null 
hypotheses tested in Ecology and The Journal of 
Wildlife Management (Anderson et al. 2000). We 
seem to be failing by addressing so many trivial 
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issues in theoretical and applied ecology. Articles 
that employ silly nulls and statistical tests of 
hypotheses known to be false severely retard 
progress in our understanding of ecological sys- 
tems and the effects of management programs 
(O'Connor 2000). The misuse and overuse of 
P-values is astonishing. Further, there is little 
analogous guidance for authors to present results 
of data analysis under the newer information-the- 
oretic or Bayesian methods. 
We suggest how to present results of data analy- 
sis under each of these 3 statistical paradigms: 
classical frequentist, information-theoretic, and 
Bayesian. We make no recommendation on the 
choice of analysis; instead, we focus on sugges- 
tions for the presentation of results of the data 
analysis. We assume authors are familiar with the 
analysis paradigm they have used; thus, we will 
not provide introductory material here. 
Frequentist Methods 
Frequentist methods, dating back at least a cen- 
tury, are much more than merely test statistics 
and P-values. P-values resulting from statistical 
tests of null hypotheses are usually of far less 
value than estimates of effect size. Authors fre- 
quently report the results of null hypothesis tests 
(test statistics, degrees of freedom, P-values) 
when-in less space-they could often report 
more complete, informative material conveyed 
by estimates of effect size and their standard 
errors or confidence intervals (e.g., the effect of 
the neck collars on winter survival probability was 
-0.036, SE = 0.012). 
The prevalence of testing null hypotheses that 
are uninteresting (or even silly) is quite high. 
For example, Anderson et al. (2000) found an 
average of 6,188 P-values per year (1993-1997) in 
Ecology and 5,263 per year (1994-1998) in The 
Journal of Wildlife Management and suggested that 
these large frequencies represented a misuse and 
overuse of null hypothesis testing methods. 
Johnson (1999) and Anderson et al. (2000) give 
examples of null hypotheses tested that were 
clearly of little biological interest, or were entire- 
ly unsupported before the study was initiated. 
We strongly recommend a substantial decrease in 
the reporting of results of null hypothesis tests 
when the null is trivial or uninteresting. 
Naked P-values (i.e., those reported without 
estimates of effect size, its sign, and a measure of 
precision) are especially to be avoided. Nonpara- 
metric tests (like their parametric counterparts) 
are based on estimates of effect size, although 
usually only the direction of the effect is reported 
(a nearly naked P-value). The problem with 
naked and nearly naked P-values is that their 
magnitude is often interpreted as indicative of 
effect size. It is misleading to interpret that small 
P-values indicate large effect sizes because small 
P-values can also result from low variability or large 
sample sizes. P-values are not a proper strength 
of evidence (Royall 1997, Sellke et al. 2001). 
We encourage authors to carefully consider 
whether the information they convey in the lan- 
guage of null hypothesis testing could be greatly 
improved by instead reporting estimates and 
measures of precision. Emphasizing estimation 
over hypothesis testing in the reporting of the 
results of data analysis helps protect against the 
pitfalls associated with the failure to distinguish 
between statistical significance and biological sig- 
nificance (Yoccoz 1991). 
We do not recommend reporting test statistics 
and P-values from observational studies, at least 
not without appropriate caveats (Sellke et al. 
2001). Such results are suggestive rather than 
conclusive given the observational nature of the 
data. In strict experiments, these quantities can 
be useful, but we still recommend a focus on the 
estimation of effect size rather than on P-values 
and their supposed statistical significance. 
The computer output of many canned statistical 
packages contains numerous test statistics and 
P-values, many of which are of little interest; report- 
ing these values may create an aura of scientific 
objectivity when both the objectivity and substance 
are often lacking. We encourage authors to resist 
the temptation to report dozens of P-values only 
because these appear on computer output. 
Do not claim to have proven the null hypothesis; 
this is a basic tenet of science. If a test yields a non- 
significant P-value, it may not be unreasonable to 
state that "the test failed to reject the null hypothe- 
sis" or that "the results seem consistent with the null 
hypothesis" and then discuss Type I and II errors. 
However, these classical issues are not necessary 
when discussing the estimated effect size (e.g, "The 
estimated effect of the treatment was small," and 
then give the estimate and a measure of precision). 
Do not report estimated test power after a sta- 
tistical test has been conducted and found to be 
nonsignificant, as such post hoc power is not 
meaningful (Goodman and Berlin 1994). A priori 
power and sample size considerations are impor- 
tant in planning an experimental design, but esti- 
mates of post hoc power should not be reported 
(Gerard et al. 1998, Hoenig and Heisey 2001). 
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Information-Theoretic Methods 
These methods date back only to the mid- 
1970s. They are based on theory published in the 
early 1950s and are just beginning to see use in 
theoretical and applied ecology. A synthesis of 
this general approach is given by Burnham and 
Anderson (1998). Much of classical frequentist 
statistics (except the null hypothesis testing 
methods) underlie and are part of the informa- 
tion-theoretic approach; however, the philosophy 
of the 2 paradigms is substantially different. 
As part of the Methods section of a paper, 
describe and justify the a priori hypotheses and 
models in the set and how these relate specifical- 
ly to the study objectives. Avoid routinely includ- 
ing a trivial null hypothesis or model in the 
model set; all models considered should have 
some reasonable level of interest and scientific 
support (Chamberlin's [1965] concept of "multi- 
ple working hypotheses"). The number of mod- 
els (R) should be small in most cases. If the study 
is only exploratory, then the number of models 
might be larger, but this situation can lead to 
inferential problems (e.g., inferred effects that are 
actually spurious; Anderson et al. 2001). Situa- 
tions with more models than samples (i.e., R > n) 
should be avoided, except in the earliest phases 
of an exploratory investigation. Models with 
many parameters (e.g., K- 30-200) often find lit- 
tle support, unless sample size or effect sizes are 
large or if the residual variance is quite small. 
A common mistake is the use of Akaike's Infor- 
mation Criterion (AIC) rather than the second- 
order criterion, AICc. Use AICC (a generally 
appropriate small-sample version of AIC) unless 
the number of observations is at least 40 times the 
number of explanatory variables (i.e., n/K > 40 
for the biggest K over all R models). If using 
count data, provide some detail on how goodness 
of fit was assessed and, if necessary, an estimate of 
the variance inflation factor (c) and its degrees of 
freedom. If evidence of overdispersion (Liang and 
McCullagh 1993) is found, the log-likelihood 
must be computed as loge (_r)/c and used in QAICc, 
a selection criterion based on quasi-likelihood the- 
ory (Anderson et al. 1994). When the appropriate 
criterion has been identified (AIC, AICC, or QAICC), 
it should be used for all the models in the set. 
Discuss or reference the use of other aspects of 
the information-theoretic approach, such as 
model averaging, a confidence set on models, 
and examination of the relative importance of 
variables. Define or reference the notation used 
(e.g., K, Ai, and wi). Ideally, the variance compo- 
nent due to model selection uncertainty should 
be included in estimates of precision (i.e., uncon- 
ditional vs. conditional standard errors) unless 
there is strong evidence favoring the best model, 
such as an Akaike weight (wi) > about 0.9. 
For well-designed, true experiments in which 
the number of effects or factors is small and fac- 
tors are orthogonal, use of the full model will 
often suffice (rather than considering more par- 
simonious models). If an objective is to assess the 
relative importance of variables, inference can be 
based on the sum of the Akaike weights for each 
variable, across models that include that variable, 
and these sums should be reported (Burnham 
and Anderson 1998:140-141). Avoid the implica- 
tion that variables not in the selected (estimated 
best) model are unimportant. 
The results should be easy to report if the 
Methods section outlines convincingly the science 
hypotheses and associated models of interest. 
Show a table of the value of the maximized log- 
likelihood function (log(_r)), the number of esti- 
mated parameters (K), the appropriate selection 
criterion (AIC, AICc, or QAICC), the simple differ- 
ences (Ai), and the Akaike weights (w%) for mod- 
els in the set (or at least the models with some rea- 
sonable level of support, such as where Ai < 10). 
Interpret and report the evidence for the various 
science hypotheses by ranking the models from 
best to worst, based on the differences (Ai), and 
on the Akaike weights (wi). Provide quantities of 
interest from the best model or others in the set 
(e.g., u2, coefficients of determination, estimates 
of model parameters and their standard errors). 
Those using the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC; Schwarz 1978) for model selection should 
justify the existence of a true model in the set of 
candidate models (Methods section). 
Do not include test statistics and P-values when 
using the information-theoretic approach since 
this inappropriately mixes differing analysis para- 
digms. For example, do not use AICc to rank 
models in the set and then test if the best model 
is significantly better than the second best model 
(no such test is valid). Do not imply that the 
information-theoretic approaches are a test in 
any sense. Avoid the use of terms such as signifi- 
cant and not significant, or rejected and not 
rejected; instead view the results in a strength of 
evidence context (Royall 1997). 
If some analysis and modeling were done after 
the a priori effort (often called data dredging), 
then make sure this procedure is clearly ex- 
plained when such results are mentioned in the 
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376 ANALYTICAL PRESENTATION SUGGESTIONS * Anderson et al. 
Discussion section. Give estimates of the impor- 
tant parameters (e.g., effect size) and measures 
of precision (preferably a confidence interval). 
Bayesian Methods 
Although Bayesian methods date back over 2 
centuries, they are not familiar to most biologists. 
Bayesian analysis allows inference from a poste- 
rior distribution that incorporates information 
from the observed data, the model, and the prior 
distribution (Schmitt 1969, Ellison 1996, Barnett 
1999, Wade 2000). Bayesian methods often re- 
quire substantial computation and have been in- 
creasingly applied since computers have become 
widely available (Lee 1997). 
In reporting results, authors should consider 
readers' lack of familiarity with Bayesian sum- 
maries such as odds ratios, Bayes factors, and cred- 
ible intervals. The clarity of a presentation can be 
greatly enhanced by a simple explanation after the 
first references to such quantities: "A Bayes factor 
of 4.0 indicates that the ratio of probabilities for 
Model 1 and Model 2 is 4 times larger when com- 
puted using the posterior rather than the prior." 
Presentations of Bayesian analyses should report 
the sensitivity of conclusions to the choice of the 
prior distribution. This portrayal of sensitivity 
can be accomplished by including overlaid graphs 
of the posterior distributions for a variety of rea- 
sonable priors or by tabular presentations of 
credible intervals, posterior means, and medians. 
An analysis based on flat priors representing 
limited or vague prior knowledge should be in- 
cluded in the model set. When the data seem to 
contradict prevailing thought, the strength of the 
contradiction can be assessed by reporting analy- 
ses based on priors reflecting prevailing thought. 
Generally, Bayesian model-checking should be 
reported. Model-checks vary among applications, 
and there are a variety of approaches even for a 
given application (Carlin and Lewis 1996, Gelman 
and Meng 1996, Gelman et al. 1995). One par- 
ticularly simple and easily implemented check is 
a posterior predictive check (Rubin 1984). The 
credibility of the results will be enhanced by a 
brief description of model-checks performed, 
especially as these relate to questionable aspects 
of the model. A lengthy report of model-checks 
will usually not be appropriate, but the credibili- 
ty of the published paper will often be enhanced 
by reporting the results of model-checks. 
The implementation of sophisticated methods 
for fitting models, such as Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC; Geyer 1992) should be reported 
in sufficient detail. In particular, MCMC requires 
diagnostics to indicate that the posterior distrib- 
ution has been adequately estimated. 
General Considerations Concerning the 
Presentation of Results 
The standard deviation (SD) is a descriptive sta- 
tistic, and the standard error (SE) is an inferen- 
tial statistic. Accordingly, the SD can be used to 
portray the variation observed in a sample: It = 
100, SD = 25 suggests a much more variable pop- 
ulation than does j = 100, SD = 5. The expected 
value (i.e., an average over a large number of 
replicate samples) of the SD2 equals U2 and 
depends very little on sample size (n). The SE is 
useful to assess the precision (repeatability) of an 
estimator. For example, in a comparison of 
males (m) and females (f), gm = 100, SE = 2 and 
[i= 120, SE = 1.5 would allow an inference that 
the population mean value g is greater among 
females than among males. Such an inference 
rests on some assumptions, such as random sam- 
pling of a defined population. Unlike the SD, 
the SE decreases with increasing sample size. 
When presenting results such as a ? b, always 
indicate if b is a SD or a SE or is t x SE (indicating 
a confidence limit), where t is from the t distrib- 
ution (e.g., 1.96 if the degrees of freedom are 
large). If a confidence interval is to be used, give 
the lower and upper limits as these are often 
asymmetric about the estimate. Authors should 
be clear concerning the distinction between pre- 
cision (measured by variances, standard errors, 
coefficients of variation, and confidence inter- 
vals) and bias (an average tendency to estimate 
values either smaller or larger than the parame- 
ter; see White et al. 1982:22-23). 
The Methods section should indicate the (1 - a) % 
confidence level used (e.g., 90, 95, or 99%). 
Information in tables should be arranged so that 
numbers to be compared are close to each other. 
Excellent advice on the visual display of quantita- 
tive information is given in Tufte (1983). Provide 
references for any statistical software and specific 
options used (e.g., equal or unequal variances in 
t-tests, procedure TTEST in SAS, or a particular 
Bayesian procedure in BUGS). The Methods sec- 
tion should always provide sufficient detail so 
that the reader can understand what was done. 
In regression, discriminant function analysis, 
and similar procedures, one should avoid the 
term independent variables because the variables 
are rarely independent among themselves or 
with the response variable. Better terms include 
J. Wildl. Manage. 65(3):2001 
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explanatory or predictor variables (see McCul- 
lagh and Nelder 1989:8). 
Avoid confusing low frequencies with small 
sample sizes. If one finds only 4 birds on 230 
plots, the proportion of plots with birds can be 
precisely estimated. Alternatively, if the birds are 
the object of study, the 230 plots are irrelevant, 
and the sample size (4) is very small. 
It is important to separate analysis of results 
based on questions and hypotheses formed 
before examining the data from results found 
after sequentially examining the results of data 
analyses. The first approach tends to be more 
confirmatory, while the second approach tends 
to be more exploratory. In particular, if the data 
analysis suggests a particular pattern leading to 
an interesting hypothesis then, at this midway 
point, few statistical tests or measures of precision 
remain valid (Lindsey 1999a,b; White 2000). That 
is, an inference concerning patterns or hypothe- 
ses as being an actual feature of the population 
or process of interest are not well supported 
(e.g., likely to be spurious). Conclusions reached 
after repeated examination of the results of prior 
analyses, while interesting, cannot be taken with 
the same degree of confidence as those from the 
more confirmatory analysis. However, these post 
hoc results often represent intriguing hypotheses 
to be readdressed with a new, independent set of 
data. Thus, as part of the Introduction, authors 
should note the degree to which the study was 
exploratory versus confirmatory. Provide infor- 
mation concerning any post hoc analyses in the 
Discussion section. 
Statistical approaches are increasingly impor- 
tant in many areas of applied science. The field 
of statistics is a science, with new discoveries lead- 
ing to changing paradigms. New methods some- 
times require new ways of effectively reporting 
results. We should be able to evolve as progress is 
made and changes are necessary. We encourage 
wildlife researchers and managers to capitalize 
on modern methods and to suggest how the 
results from such methods might be best pre- 
sented. We hope our suggestions will be viewed 
as constructive. 
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